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OSAGES, IRON HORSES AND REVERSIONARY
INTERESTS: THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES v. ATTERBERRY ON RAILROAD
ABANDONMENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 23, 1982, the United States of American, as trustee
for the Osage Tribe of Indians, filed fifty-four suits to quiet title to an
abandoned railroad right of way in Osage County, Oklahoma.' The
Midland Valley Railroad Company had acquired a railroad easement
in 1905, pursuant to the provisions of sections 13 through 23 of the
Enid and Anadarko Act.2 The Enid and Anadarko Act provided for
the acquisition of railroad rights of way in the Indian Territory and
through Indian lands in the Territory of Oklahoma.3 The Texas and
Pacific Railway became the successor in interest to the Midland Valley
Railroad Company in 1967.
Following the Civil War, Congress sought to encourage the westward expansion of the United States.4 As early as February of 1887,
Congress began promulgating various allotment acts that provided for
the severalty of tribal lands5 as well as for the development of railroad
systems in Indian Territory. 6 After the division in severalty of the com1. United States v. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B, slip op. (N.D. Okla.
Nov. 30, 1984). These cases were consolidated because a common question concerning the interpretation of applicable law was involved. This judgment incorporates by reference a prior order.
The Order, United States v. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B (N.D. Okla. June
25, 1984) (order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment), is the basis for this analysis.
2. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, §§ 13-23, 32 Stat. 43, 47-51.
3. At statehood, the territorial borders of the land designated as Indian Territory and the
land designated as Oklahoma Territory were combined to make the current State of Oklahoma.
See Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906). See also J. MORRIS, C. GOINS & E.
McREYNOLDS, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF OKLAHOMA Map 58 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
HISTORICAL ATLAS].
4. See 5B G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 2716 (J. Grimes ed. 1978).
5. SeeAct of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, §§ 2-11, 24 Stat. 388, 388-91 (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-358 (1982)), which provided a conceptual framework for the allotment of Indian lands and
established that allotment created equal citizenship based on the laws of the State or Territory in
which the allottee resided.
6. The Seminoles entered into the first Indian Territory treaty in March 1866. See W. SEMPLE, OKLAHOMA INDIAN LAND TITLES § 343, at 259 (1952). Response to railroad development in
Indian Territory was mixed. The full-blood factions tended to be distrustful while the legislatures
of the Cherokee and the Choctaw nations actively promoted stock in Indian-backed companies.
See Miner, "Little Houses on Wheel?': Indian Response to the Railroaa in RAILROADS IN
OKLAHOMA 7 (D. Hofsommer ed. 1977).
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mon tribal lands, the allottee was governed by state and federal laws

like every other citizen. 7 These two parallel trends, railroad development and allotment of Indian lands, are the nucleus for the controversy

over the Midland Valley right of way.
In United States v. Atterberry, the question before the Court was
whether the abutting landowners have title to the underlying fee to the

right of way, upon its abandonment by the railroad.8 The United
States, as trustee for the Osage Tribe of Indians, claimed the land as the
original grantor. 9 The defendants, as heirs, beneficiaries or assigns of

the original Osage allottees, also claimed title based on the language of
the government patents. 10 In bringing this action, the United States
was seeking a very narrow interpretation of the Enid and Anadarko
Act." Sections 13 through 23, the provisions by which the Midland
Valley right of way was obtained, do not contain specific language regarding reversionary interests; however, such language is found in sec-

tion 2 of the Act which states that an abandoned right of way reverts to
the Indian Tribe from which it was purchased.'

2

This viewpoint is

within the presumption that ambiguous legislation should be resolved
in favor of the Indians.' 3 The defendants maintained that such a reading of the Act is inconsistent with the Act itself, with other pertinent
legislation, with federal and state common law and with the language
found in the government patents issued to the original Osage
14

allottees.

Although the issue in Atterberry was narrow, an outcome
favorable to the Osages would have reverberated throughout
7. See Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1950). The court held that when
the tribes in the allotment treaties surrendered their tribal domains and took allotments in severalty, state law applied in civil and criminal matters. The court determined that congressional
intent was to "disestablish the organized reservations and assimilate members of the Indian tribes
as citizens of the state or territory." Id. at 97-98. But see United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467,
471 (1926) (federal law held to control over murder on restricted Osage Allotment lands).
8. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3, Atlerberry.
9. Petitioner's Complaint at 1, Atterberry.
10. Answer Brief of Defendants [Kelly & Gambill] at 2, Allerberry.
11. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, 32 Stat. 43. See also Defendants' Oral Arguments on Motions for Summary Judgment (Mar. 22, 1984), Alterberry.
12. Plaintiffs Opening Brief on Interpretation of the Enid and Anadarko Act at 2-3, Atterberry. See also Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 137, 32 Stat. 43.
13. See Plaintiffs Opening Brief on Interpretation of the Enid and Anadarko Act at 7-8,
Atterberry. See also Leavenworth, L. & G. R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733 (1875); accord
Bennett County v. United States, 394 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1968) (Indian legislation should be strictly
construed).
14. Defendants' Oral Arguments on Motions for Summary Judgment (Mar. 22, 1984),
Atterberry.
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Oklahoma. At a minimum, such a decision would have created afortysix mile long "Chinese Wall" bisecting Osage County.' 5 Moreover, at
least three additional railroad right of way abandonments have taken
place or are pending in Osage County. Finally, the impact could affect
the entire former Territory of Oklahoma wherever railroads cross other
Indian lands or allotments. Judge Brett, however, ruled in favor of the
defendants, stating that "the general common rule which vests in the
abutting landowner the entire title and estate in the strip16 of land set
apart for a railroad right of way just makes good sense."
This Comment will explore the reasoning underpinning the holding in Atterberryby examining the Enid and Anadarko Act as it relates
to the issue of whether the abandoned railroad right of way reverts to
the Osage Indian Tribe or to the abutting landowners. An interpretation of the Enid and Anadarko Act is dependent upon an examination
of the legislative intent behind the enactment, a comparison with other
enactments, an understanding of the theory behind the issuance of the

patent deeds, and a review of the applicable case law. As will be discussed below, the Atterberry holding is important because it helps to
close an eighty-two year old gap inherent in the Enid and Anadarko
Act and to resolve forty-two years of litigation.'
15. Outline of Defendants' Oral Arguments in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 8,Auerberry.
One defense attorney wondered why the Osage Indian Tribe wanted "the worlds longest
jogging track." Answer Brief of Defendants [Kelly & Gambill] at 3, Atterberry. If the Osage
Tribe was successful in obtaining the right of way, it intended to require trespass damages from
"local farmers and ranchers" who had to cross the right of way to reach their pastures. Letter
from David L. Baldwin, Superintendent of Osage Agency, to Bank of Oklahoma, N.A., (Sept. 28,
1979). The letter stated that no trespass damages would be "due for use of this [Midland Valley]
railroad right of way" until after a quiet title suit confirmed ownership of the right of way. Id.
16. Alterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 31. In the oral arguments on the
motions for summary judgment before United States District Judge Thomas R. Brett on March
22, 1984, the United States Attorney indicated that the Osage Tribe of Indians would appeal an
adverse ruling since the question raised by this case was of first impression.
17. In United States v. Midland Valley R.R., No. 353 Civil, slip op. (N.D. Okla. 1942), the
Osages initiated a suit to collect the $15 per mile damages authorized by § 15 of the Enid and
Anadarko Act for the entire 78 mile Midland Valley right of way. The court found that the right
of way was constructed in compliance with the requirements of the Enid and Anadarko Act but
that the railroad had failed to make any of the annual payments authorized by the Act. However,
"liability for such payments terminated upon the approval of the allotment deeds by the Secretary
of the Interior.... Id. at 4. The railroad was ordered to pay $4,727.85 in mileage payments to
the Osage Tribe of Indians from the year 1905 (when the construction on the railroad was completed) to 1909 (when the last allotment deed was approved). Id at 4-5. "[S]ince the action is
brought by the United States the statutes of limitation do not apply, and no request or demand for
payment having been made for more than thirty-five ... years it follows that it would be inequitable to allow interest upon the amount found due [.]Interest will be allowed only from the date
Id. This ruling is of limited precedential value for the
of the entry of judgment herein ......
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THE ENID AND ANADARKO ACT

Because Congress wanted to foster expansion of the United States,
it made an effort to encourage development by enacting legislation to
provide transportation to and through the rapidly growing western
United States. The Enid and Anadarko Act18 is an example of such
legislation. The Act was passed prior to Oklahoma statehood with a
two-fold purpose. The first purpose governed the right of the Enid and
Anadarko Railway Company to acquire a right of way for a route generally going from what is now central Oklahoma easterly to Arkansas.' 9 The second purpose established a method for other railroad
companies to acquire future rights of way through the two territories.2 0
Section 1 of the Act established the power of the Enid and
Anadarko Railroad Company to acquire rights of way from the town
of Geary in Blaine County, Oklahoma Territory easterly through Indian Territory to Fort Smith, Arkansas. 2' This route travelled far
south of the Osage lands.22 According to section 2, the right of way so
issue raised in Atterberry because the Midland Valley court did not consider who had title to the
right of way since it was still being used for railroad purposes.
In 1949, the Commissioner for Indian Affairs wrote to the Superintendent of the Osage
Agency stating, "[i]n view of the [the Midland Valley decision] and the decision in . . . United
States v. Magnola [sic] Petroleum Company. . . [110 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1923)], it is our opinion
that the Osage Nation has no interest in the portion of the [Midland Valley] right of way. . . and
that upon abandonment by the railroad company, the ownership thereof would revert to the owner
ofthe abuttingland" Letter from H.M. Crutchfield to T.B. Hall (April 4, 1949) (emphasis added),
However, by 1969, the Osages had decided to contest the 1949 opinion and to attempt to quiet
title in the right of way in favor of the Tribe. See Memorandum from the Associate Solicitor for
Indian Affairs to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (March 21, 1969) (discussing the interests of
the Osage Tribe in abandoned railroad rights of way).
18. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, 32 Stat. 43.
19. Id ch. 134, §§ 1-12, 32 Stat. 43, 43-47.
20. Id ch. 134, §§ 13-23, 32 Stat. 43, 47-51. See also W. SEMPLE, supra note 6, § 357 for a
discussion of the purpose and provisions of the Enid and Anadarko Act. Until this Act was
passed, railroads were required to obtain specific legislation in order to obtain a right of way. See
infra note 41-42 and accompanying text.
21. Ch. 134, § 1, 32 Stat. 43, 43, reads:
That the EnidandAnadarko Railway Company... is hereby, invested and empowered
with the right of locating, constructing, owning, equipping, operating, using, and maintaining a railway and telegraph and telephone line through the Territory of Oklahoma
and the Indian Territory, beginning at a point on its railway between Anadarko and
Watonga, in the Territory of Oklahoma, thence in an easterly direction by the most
practicable route to a point on the eastern boundary of the Indian Territory near Fort
Smith ....
Id (emphasis added).
22. This railroad line ran from Geary, in Blaine County, through Oklahoma City, in
Oklahoma Territory, through Seminole and Wewoka (Seminole lands) and through McAlester,
Wilburton and Wister (Choctaw lands) in Indian Territory to Hartford and Mansfield in Arkansas. In 1903 this rail line was purchased by the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad. The
main line of the Enid and Anadarko Railway Company was in Oklahoma Territory and ran
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acquired was an easement and the underlying estate remains with the
Indian tribe or nation from which that specific easement was carved. 3
Provisions regarding the actual details of establishing the Enid and

Anadarko Railway Company, such as maximum land rates, condemnation proceedings, freight and passenger rates and time of construc-

tion, were found in sections 3 through 11.24 These requirements were
all subject to congressional amendment."

The remaining sections of the Act set out a pattern whereby future
railroads could be built through Indian lands in Oklahoma Territory
and in Indian Territory.26 The Enid and Anadarko Act provided a
comprehensive scheme for railroad building and it supplanted the
more general Indian Railroad Right of Way Act.27 So far as Indian
lands were concerned, section 13 of the Enid and Anadarko Act
granted only the power to take and condemn rights of way for con-

struction of railroads, telegraph and telephone lines.28 Sections 14
westerly from Enid, in Garfield County, to Meno, in Major County, then southerly to Okeene and
Geary in Blaine County, then to Anadarko, in Caddo County, and on to Lawton, in Commanche
County. See Outline of Defendants' Oral Argument in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4-5, .4terberry.
23. Ch. 134, § 2, 32 Stat. 43, 43-44 reads:
That said corporation is authorized to take and use for all purposes of a railway, and for
no other purpose, a right of way one hundred feet in width through said Oklahoma
Territory and said Indian Territory... and when any portion thereof shall cease to be
so used such portion shall revert to the nation or tribe of Indians from which the same
shall have been taken.
Id.

In 1902, the process to distribute allotments to individual members of the Five Civilized
Tribes had begun, but the majority of the land was still held by the tribes as a whole. See generally W. SEMPLE, supra note 6, §§ 15-24; see also A. DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE
BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 3-60 (1972 ed.) (discussion of the allotment process for

the Five Civilized Tribes). The actual allotment of Osage lands did not commence until after the
passage of the Osage Allotment Act in 1906. See generally W. SEMPLE, supra note 6, §§ 638-56.
24. See ch. 134, §§ 3-11, 32 Stat. 43, 44-46.
25. See ch. 134, § 12, 32 Stat. 43, 47.
26. See ch. 134, §§ 13-23, 32 Stat. 43, 47-51.
27. Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 374, 30 Stat. 990 (current version as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 312-318 (1982)). This Act provides the foundation for all rights of way through any Indian
lands outside of Oklahoma. Only the lands allotted to unrestricted Indians are exempt from its
provisions. On non-Indian lands, including Oklahoma non-Indian lands, [see infra notes 105-09
and accompanying text] the General Railroad Right of Way Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 152, 18
Stat. 482 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 934-938 (1982)) applied. Railroad rights of way under either of
these two acts were limited to easements [see infranotes 65-69 and accompanying text]. The Enid
and Anadarko Act, however, created an exception to the general rule and clearly provided that
any rights of way acquired in Oklahoma were easements.
28. Ch. 134, § 13, 32 Stat. 43, 47 states:
That the right to locate, construct, own, equip, operate, use, and maintain a railway...
together with the right to take and condemn lands for right of way. . . and other railway
purposes, in or through any lands held by any Indian tribe or nation, person, individual,
or municipality in said Territory, or in or through any lands in said Territory which have
been or may hereafter be allotted in severalty to any individual Indian or other person
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through 22 defined the nature and extent of that power. Finally, section 23 placed the lands in Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory

outside the provisions of the Indian Railroad Right of Way Act, and
made the Enid and Anadarko Act controlling over future grants to rail-

roads on Indian reservations or allotments. z9
Even though a railroad might have filed its maps of location and
even though the Secretary of Interior might have approved those maps,
it could not take the property sought, enter into possession of it, or
commence construction unless payment was made for the damage
which would occur due to the development of the railway.30 Once
31
damages were paid, the railroad received an easement in the land.

Under the provisions of the Enid and Anadarko Act, any railroad
could acquire an easement in the land for its proposed right of way
only after full compliance with sections 13 through 23 of the Act. However, there is no reversionary clause in these sections.

In support of its position regarding ownership of the Midland Valley Railroad right of way, the United States maintained that the language found in section 23 of "this Act" meant that the whole Act (i.e.,

sections 1 through 23 including the reversionary clause found in section
2) applied to the Atterberry right of way. 32 Although this interpretation
would have clearly resolved the Atterberry question in favor of the
United States, it is an incorrect and inconsistent interpretation of the
Act. Sections 1 through 12 are specifically directed towards only the
Enid and Anadarko Railway Company, an individual corporate entity.
under any law or treaty, whether the same have or have not been conveyed to the allottee, with full power of alientation, is hereby granted to any railway company.. . which
shall comply with this Act.
Id.
29. Ch. 134, § 23, 32 Stat. 43, 50-51 provides:
That an Act entitled "An Act to provide for the acquiring of rights of way by railroad
companies through Indian reservations, Indian lands, and Indian allotments, and for
other purposes," approved March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, so far as it
applies to the Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory, and all other Acts or parts of
Acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed... And providedfurther, That the
provisions of this Act shall apply also to the Osages' Reservation and other Indian reservations and allotted Indian lands in the Territory of Oklahoma ....
Id. (emphasis added).
30. See 55 Interior Dec. 451 (Jan. 30, 1935), on reh'g, 55 Interior Dec. 456 (April 23, 1936).
See also supra note 17 (discussion of United States v. Midland Valley R.R.).
31. See Gutensohn v. McGuirt, 194 Okla. 64, 147 P.2d 777 (1944) (reversionary interest
vested in the heirs of the Creek freedman allottee). See generally W. SEMPLE, supra note 6, § 351
(title to abandoned rights of way in Indian Territory), § 721-22 (rights of way in Osage County),
§ 796-97 (rights of way for "wild" tribes). See also 5B G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2716 (railroad land grants).
32. Plaintiff's Oral Arguments on Motions for Summary Judgment (Mar. 22, 1984),
Atterberry.
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These sections authorized a specific railway line from a clearly defined
point A to a point B. This is special legislation in favor of one railroad
company.33 Other early railroad lines built in Oklahoma and Indian
Territories were authorized by comparable special congressional grants
benefitting only that railway line.34 At least one act contained language similar to the provisions found in sections 1 through 12 of the
Enid and Anadarko Act.35 In addition, many of the provisions found
in sections 1 through 12 of the Enid and Anadarko Act are nearly exact
duplicates of the provisions found in sections 13 through 23.36 If Congress had intended for the reversionary clause in section 2 to apply to
all future rights of way under the Act, then it would not have written
sections 13 through 22 but would have simply added the provisions in
section 23 to the existing provisions in sections 1 through 12.
In Atterberry,the court reviewed the legislative history of the Enid
and Anadarko Act and determined that this Act was two entirely separate enactments meshed together. 38 At the time the Enid and
Anadarko Act was introduced into the Fifty-seventh Congress, the
Enid and Anadarko Railway Company needed quick access through
Indian Territory because it had "already constructed about 60 [sic]
miles of its railway in Oklahoma Territory. . . -39 The bill introduced, H.R. 3104,40 was the predecessor to sections 1 through 12 of the
Enid and Anadarko Act and included the reversionary clause of section
2. This bill was solely for the benefit of the Enid and Anadarko Railway Company. When the Secretary of Interior reviewed H.R. 3104, he
stated that he had no objections to it but that he would prefer to see
general enabling legislation developed to govern future railroad right
of way grants in Indian Territory.4 '
33. See W. SEMPLE, supra note 6, § 357.
34. Id at §§ 342-50 (discussion of railroads built in Oklahoma prior to 1902).
35. Compare ch. 134, §§ 1-12, 32 Stat. 43,43-47 (Enid and Anadarko Act) with Act of Mar. 3,
1899, ch. 453, 30 Stat. 1368 (which granted an easement right of way to the Fort Smith and West-

ern Railroad Company with a reversion to the Choctaw and Creek Nations).
36. Compare § 2 with § 13 (condemnation powers); § 3 with § 14 (right of way widths); § 3
with § 15 (compensation): §§ 4 and 5 with § 16 (rates); and § 11 with § 20 (mortgaging property) of
32 Stat. 43. See also Defendants' Oral Arguments on Motions for Summary Judgment (Mar. 22,
1984), Atterberry.

37. Id
38. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 6-10.
39. H.R. REP. No. 257, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1902).
40. H.R. 3104, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., (1901). See also - CONG. REc. 1201-02 (Feb. 1, 1902)
(statement of Rep. Curtis explaining purpose of H.R. 3104), photocopy obtained from court file,
Atterberry.
41. Letter from E. A. Hitchcock to Hon. Charles Curtis (Jan. 18, 1902), reprintedinH.R.REP.
No. 257, supra note 39, at 2.
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During the three months in which the Enid and Anadarko Act was

before the Fifty-seventh Congress, six additional bills concerning railroad rights of way through Indian Territory were introduced. Four
bills were special legislation for specific railroads and contained reversionary clauses, 42 while two were proposals for general legislation and

lacked a reversionary provision.43 These latter two bills" were a basis
for sections 13 through 23 of the Enid and Anadarko Act when H.R.
3104 was amended by the Senate.45 In the Joint Conference Committee Report, H.R. 3104 was further amended to include "the Osage Reservation and other Indian reservations and allotted Indian lands in the

Territory of Oklahoma ... 46 Thus, the Enid and Anadarko Act was
an ad hoc measure designed to provide immediate relief for the Enid

and Anadarko Railway Company as well as to create a skeletal procedure so that Congress would not be inundated by further special legislation in Indian Territory or upon Indian lands, including the Osage
Reservation, in Oklahoma Territory.
The Enid and Anadarko Act is best understood as a hybrid of two
distinctly different types of congressional legislation. The first half of
the Act is a grant in favor of an individual corporate entity, the Enid
and Anadarko Railway Company. The second half of the Act is nonspecific enabling legislation which created a procedure for the future.

As enabling legislation, the nuts and bolts of these enactments would
[I]t
is very much better for all concerned that the railroad rights of way in Indian Territory should be obtained and held under general legislation of like application to all instances of a like character, but if it is anticipated that the difficulty and delay incident to
the enactment of proper general legislation will be materially greater than those incident
to special acts. . . the construction of. . .railroads. . . will. . . be facilitated by...
resorting to special legislation. . . .If special legislation is to be had, I find no serious
objection to the bill ....
Id.
42. H.R. 11003, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1902) (for Saint Louis and San Francisco R.R.);
H.R. 11098, 57th Cong., IstSess. § 2 (1902) (for Missouri, Kansas and Oklahoma R.R. through
the Osage Reservation); S.3601, 57th Cong., IstSess. § 2 (1902) (similar to H.R. 11003); S. 3741,
57th Cong., IstSess. § 2 (1902) (similar to H.R. 11098). Apparently these proposed bills were
abandoned upon the passage of the Enid and Anadarko Act. See generally W. SEMPLE, supranote
6, §§ 346-350, for a discussion of the four railroad lines authorized by special legislation prior to
1902.
43. H.R. 10065, 57th Cong., IstSess. (1902); S.3745, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902) (these bills
were concerned only with rights of way in Indian Territory).
44. Compare H.R. 10065 andS. 3745, supra note 43, with Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, §§ 1322, 32 Stat. 43, 47-50. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
45. - CONG. REC. 1751-52 (Feb. 14, 1902) (statement of Sen. Cockrell), photocopy obtained
from court file, Alterberry.
46. - CONG. REC. 1900 (Feb. 19, 1902) (statement of Sen. Rawlins), photocopy obtained
from court file, Atterber.
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be more fully defined at some appropriate time.4 7 Therefore, the Enid
and Anadarko Act may be understood only in light of subsequent
legislation.
III.

OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATION

Congressional legislation took a vacillating path in defining the
scope of the various land grants for railroad rights of way. Federal
grants of public lands have been made to railroads in three ways:
grants of right of way easements; direct grants of land; and grants to a
state as trustee for the use and benefit of a railroad company.4" Generally, congressional legislation prior to 1875 involved a fee simple grant
to the railroad, while post 1875 legislation limited the railroads to acquiring only easement rights of way.49 Thus, in order to understand
the Enid and Anadarko Act and its proper position in the entire body
of laws governing Indians in Oklahoma, it is necessary to compare the
Act with other legislation, including Oklahoma statutory provisions,
general federal railroad legislation and federal enactments specific to
Oklahoma Indians.
A.

Oklahoma Law

The State of Oklahoma was formed by combining the lands
known as the Indian Territory with the Territory of Oklahoma. 50 Indian Territory was the land of the Five Civilized Tribes.5" Oklahoma
Territory included the Osage Reservation, the lands of some twentythree "wild" tribes, 52 and certain non-Indian or "unassigned" public
lands.5 3 Oklahoma Territory was formally organized under the Organic Act54 in 1890. In addition to establishing the mechanics for the
47. Such an interpretation would be consistent with a reading of § 21 (Congress can amend
"at any time") and § 22 (a general extension of the privileges found in the Enid and Anadarko Act
to other railroad companies already in existence in Oklahoma in 1902). See Act of Feb. 28, 1902,
ch. 134, § 21-22, 32 Stat. 43, 50.
48. See 5B G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2716, at 344.
49. See generally 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 381. But see Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v.
Roberts, 152 U.S. 114 (1894) (Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 270, 14 Stat. 289 allowed fee simple
purchase of railroad right of way through the former Osage tribal lands in Kansas).
50. See Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267. See also HISTORICAL ATLAS, supranote
3, Map 57 (showing counties of Oklahoma Territory and recording districts of Indian Territory).
51. These are the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Seminole Tribes of Indians.
See HISTORICAL ATLAS, supra note 3, Map 23.
52. See HISTORICAL ATLAS, supra note 3, Maps 54 and 55. See generally W. SEMPLE, supra
note 6, §§ 735-752 (General Allotment Act Indian Tribes).
53. See HISTORICAL ATLAS, supra note 3, Maps 33, 34, 45 and 54.
54. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:255

operation of the territorial government, the Organic Act limited railroads to the acquisition of easements for rights of way and for stations.55 In a separate provision, the Organic Act also provided that title
to vacated public highways should return to the "owner of the tract of
which it formed a part of the original survey.' '5 6 Although the reversionary interest in public highways clearly vests in the abutting landowner by this enactment, the Organic Act is silent about the ownership
of the reversionary interest in railroad rights of way.
The next significant piece of legislation was the Oklahoma Enabling Act 57 which applies to all of present day Oklahoma. While this
enactment did not specifically deal with railroads, it did contain many
provisions regarding the rights of Indians.58 It specifically provided
that representatives from the Osage Tribe of Indians were to participate
in the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention. 9 Additionally, the laws
of Oklahoma Territory, rather than those of Indian Territory, were to
60
extend over and apply in the proposed state.
The Oklahoma Constitution, passed in 1907, was the ultimate
agenda behind the Oklahoma Enabling Act. 61 The Constitution contained a provision regarding the reversionary interest in railroad rights
of way easements. "Railroads heretofore constructed, or which may
hereafter be constructed in this State, are hereby declared public highways."'62 This provision clarified the Organic Act, which stated that
title to vacated highways returns to the abutting landowners. 63 Therefore, state law unequivocably established that the owner of the reversionary interest in a railroad right of way is the owner of the land from
which the easement was carved and not the remote grantor of the right
55. Id The Organic Act states in part:
No part of the land embraced within the Territory hereby created shall inure to the use

or benefit of any railroad corporation, except the rights of way and land for stations
heretofore granted to certain railroad corporations. Nor shall any provisions of this act
-. invest any corporation owning or operating any railroad in the Indian Territory, or

Territory created by this act, with any land or right to any land in either of said Territories ....

Id at § 18, 26 Stat. 81, 91.

56. Id at § 23, 26 Stat. 81, 92.
57. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267.
58. See id at § 1, 34 Stat. 267, 267. The rights of Indians were to be unimpaired. Id.
59. Id at § 2, 34 Stat. 267, 268. See also id at § 21, 34 Stat. 267, 277 (The Osage Reservation
was to remain intact and become one county, which explains Osage County's status as the state's

largest county).
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id at § 13, 34 Stat. 268, 275.
Id at § 1, 34 Stat. 267, 267-68.
OKLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 6.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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of way. Since the general rule is that allotted (as opposed to reserva-

tion) Indians are subject to state law unless there is a specific federal
law to the contrary'

and since the Osage Tribe participated in the

Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, it should be estopped from
claiming an exemption from state law unless there is an overriding fed-

eral provision.
B.

FederalEnactments

Federal law as it pertains to railroad rights of way through
Oklahoma Indian lands is, at best, circuitous, as shown by Table 1 in
the Appendix. In 1875, Congress passed the General Railroad Right of
Way Act 65 which governed all railroads on public lands except for Indian reservations.6 6 This Act limited railroads to acquisition of rights
of way in easement rather than in fee simple. 67 The 1899 Indian Railroad Right of Way Act6" contained similar provisions for railroad
rights of way through Indian lands.69 Neither the General Railroad
Right of Way Act nor the Indian Railroad Right of Way Act contained
express provisions regarding ownership of abandoned rights of way. In
1902, the Enid and Anadarko Act was promulgated and section 23 specifically excluded all Oklahoma Indian lands from the Indian Railroad
64. Cf United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973) (Oklahoma estate taxes must be paid
upon the estates of restricted Osage Indians); United States v. LaMotte, 67 F.2d 788 (10th Cir.
1933) (holding that the Osage Allotment Act should be strictly construed. Therefore, land owned
by an unrestricted Osage Indian was freely alienable prior to the passage of Act of Mar. 2, 1929,
ch. 493, 45 Stat. 1478 [which restricted alienability of land of unrestricted Osage Indians]); In re
Mosier's Estate, 199 Okla. 228, 235 P. 199 (1925) (the Osage Allotment Act contained express
provisions concerning intestate succession which created an exception to Oklahoma laws of descent and distribution).
65. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-938 (1982)).
Compare § 1, 18 Stat. 482, 482 with Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, § 13, 32 Stat. 43, 47 (Enid and
Anadardo Act). See also quotation supra note 28.
66. Ch. 152, § 5, 18 Stat. 482, 483. The District of Columbia and military reservations are
also excluded from this Act. Id.
67. Ch. 152, §§ 1-4, 18 Stat. 482, 482-83. The key case in interpreting the nature of the rights
of way obtained under the General Railroad Right of Way Act is Great Northern Ry. v. United
States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942). In GreatNorthern the court said that the General Railroad Right of
Way Act only granted easement rights of way and not fee simple title to the railroad. 315 U.S. at
27 1. The issue in dispute was the ownership of mineral rights underlying the right of way. The
Supreme Court would only quiet title to the minerals in favor of the United States, as original
grantor, where the United States was still the owner of the land abutting the right of way. 315
U.S. at 279-80. Hence, the court held that reversionary interest in rights of way governed by the
General Railroad Right of Way Act vested in the owner of the land from which the right of way
was carved.
68. Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 374,30 Stat. 990 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318 (1982)).
69. Id. ch. 374, §§ 1-4, 30 Stat. 990, 990-91. Compare25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318 (Indian Railroad
Right of Way Act) with 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-938 (General Railroad Right of Way Act).
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Right of Way Act.70 As discussed above, sections 13 through 23 of the
Enid and Anadarko Act created a void with regard to the ownership of
reversionary interests in the event of abandonment of the railroad right
of way.71
Congress was partially aware of this legislative void as seen by the
flurry of enactments passed in the spring of 1906. The first enactment,
found in section 14 of the Five Civilized Tribes Act,72 amended the
provisions of the Enid and Anadarko Act by clarifying that the underlying interest in the right of way vested in the estate from which it was
carved. There were two exceptions to this provision. The railroad had
until 1908 to purchase a fee interest in preexisting rights of way. If the
then the reversionary interest
land was located within a municipality
73
was vested in that municipality.
The Five Civilized Tribes Act provided that easements acquired
under the Enid and Anadarko Act could be converted to a fee simple
interest upon payment of additional monies to the appropriate tribe. If,
however, the railroad chose not to acquire a fee simple easement, the
possibility of reverter in the land vested in the "owner of the legal subdivision"'74 from which the right of way was taken. The payment re-

quired by the Five Civilized Tribes Act was for the servient estate so
that the entire fee estate in land could be acquired by the railroad.
Failure to pay this additional amount meant that the servient estate
vested in the abutting landowner.7 5 It is clear that the payment contemplated by the Five Civilized Tribes Act was for a purpose entirely
70. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, § 23, 32 Stat. 43, 50. Originally, the right of way width

provisions in the Indian Railroad Right of Way Act were applied to railroads in Indian Territory.
Cf.Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 374, § 2, 30 Stat. 990, 991 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 312-314
(1982)).
71. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, §§ 13-23, 32 Stat. 43, 47-5 1. See supra notes 32-47 and

accompanying text.
72. Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 14, 34 Stat. 137, 142.

73. Ch. 1876, § 14, 34 Stat. at 142 reads in part:
That the lands in the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole nations reserved from allotment ... That this section shall not apply to land reserved from allot-

ment because of the right of any railroad ... company therein in the nature of an
easement for right of way. . . or other uses connected with the maintenance and operation of such company's railroad, title to which tracts may be acquired by the railroad

.but if any such company shall fail to make payment within the time prescribed by
the regulations or shall cease to use such land for the purpose for which it was reserved,
title thereto shall thereupon vest in the owner of the legalsubdivision of which the land so
abandonedis apart,except lands within a municopallty the title to which, upon abandonment, shall vest in such municipality.
Id (emphasis added).

74. Id.
75. See generally 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 381 (discussing railroad, municipal and

state rights of way).
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distinct from the payment required by section 15 of the Enid and
Anadarko Act,7 6 and that the first payment was in addition to and independent of the latter payment.7 7
The Five Civilized Tribes Act was intended to equalize the major
differences between the Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory so

that the State of Oklahoma could be formed.78 However, Oklahoma

Territory lands, including Osage tribal lands, were outside the provisions of the Five Civilized Tribes Act.7 9 Osage lands were governed by
the Osage Allotment Act,"° which was mainly concerned with retention

of mineral interests for the benefit of the tribe as a whole.81 The secon-

dary concern of the Osage Allotment Act was the manner in which the

tribal lands were to be equally divided among the individual members
of the tribe.8 2 The Act contained detailed provisions for the method
and selection of the individual allotments.8 3 The Osage was the only

Oklahoma tribe in which all of the tribal lands were allotted solely to
tribal members.8 4 Unique among all the Oklahoma Indian Tribes was

gas and mineral rights for a theoretOsage tribal retention of all the 8oil,
5
years.
twenty-five
of
period
ical
Section 11 contained provisions regarding railroad rights of way:
SEC. 11. That all lands taken or condemned by any railroad company in the Osage Reservation ... are hereby, reserved from selection and allotment and confirmed in such railroad companies for
their use and benefit ... Provided,That such railroad companies
76. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, § 15, 32 Stat. 43, 47-48.
77. See generally 55 Interior Dec. 451 (Jan. 30, 1935), on reh'g, 55, Interior Dec. 456 (Apr. 23,
1936) (discussing the Enid and Anadarko Act as amended by § 14 of the Five Civilized Tribes
Act).
78. Cf Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137. The Five Civilized Tribes Act was intended to be the controlling legislation for Indian Territory, as indicated by its very title.
79. Today, Osage County is commonly considered to be part of eastern Oklahoma because it
is east of Interstate 35. Eastern Oklahoma is generally thought to follow the boundaries of the
former Indian Territory. However, the Osage Reservation was part of Oklahoma Territory. See
HISTORICAL ATLAS, supra note 3, Maps 55-57.
80. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539.
81. Id. at §§ 3, 11, 34 Stat. 539, 543-45.
82. Id. at §§ 1-2, 34 Stat. 539, 539-43.
83. Id
84. See L. MILLS, OKLAHOMA INDIAN LAND LAWS § 392, at 376 (1924). For all other
Oklahoma Indian tribes, surplus lands were made available for purchase by non-Indians rather
than being equally divided among tribal members.
85. Cf L. MILLS, supranote 84, § 404; W. SEMPLE, supranote 6, § 643; andF. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 788-97 (R. Strickland ed. 1982) for discussions of the Osage mineral rights. See also Pub. L. No. 95-496, §§ 4, 5, 8, Oct. 21, 1978, 92 Stat. 1660 (extending Osage
tribal interest in mineral rights). Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
this mineral retention includes limestone. See Millsap v. Andrus, 717 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir.
1983).
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shall not take or acquire hereby any6 right of title to any oil, gas, or
other mineral in any of said lands.
A definitive provision governing the disposition of abandoned railroad
rights of way is conspicuously absent from the Osage Allotment Act.
The above language in Section 11 is ambiguous: it could mean that the
Osage Tribe retained the reversionary interest for the Tribe as a whole;
or that the railroad received a fee simple grant except for minerals; or
that the original Osage Allotments were subject to the preexisting rights
of way. This ambiguity is especially confusing because the Osage Allotment Act did contain several very specific provisions regarding the
allotment procedures, alienability, and retention of oil and gas mineral
87
rights.
The ambiguity regarding railroad rights of way is even more puzzling when the legislative history of the Osage Allotment Act is examined. An earlier version (H.R. 17478) of the Osage Allotment Act
was introduced in 1904.88 The committee reported:
The object of this bill is to provide for an equal division of the lands
and moneys of the Osage tribe of Indians ....
After each member
is given a homestead, it provides that the remaining lands shall be
divided as equally as practicable among the members of said tribe,
giving to each as nearly aspossiblethe same number of acres offarming, mineral,andgrazing lands.8 9
The committee report also stated that H. R. 17478 would be submitted
to the Osage Tribe as a whole "for ratification before the same should
be of full force and effect" '9 0 since the Osages owned title to their reservation by a government patent.
The following year, H.R. 1533391 was introduced into Congress.
This bill "was submitted to the Osages at the last general election held
by them, and was adopted by all factions of the tribe." 92 This bill did
contain a reversionary clause,9 3 although it was not as detailed as sec86. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, § 11, 34 Stat. 539, 545 [emphasis in original].

87. Id at §§ 1-3, 34 Stat. 539, 539-44.
88. H.R. REP. No. 4622, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1905) (discussing H.R. 17478, 58th Cong.,Sess. (1904).
89. Id at 1 (emphasis added).
90. Id at 3. The Osage Tribe was relocated from Kansas to Oklahoma in the late nineteenth
century on land that had once been part of the Cherokee Outlet and which was purchased from
the Cherokee Nation. See Act of June 5, 1872, ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228. Relocation served two
purposes: (I) it opened up the former Osage lands in Kansas for white settlement and (2) it was
another example of a Congressional attempt to consolidate the various Indian tribes into one
general and more limited area. See W. SEMPLE, supranote 6, § 638.
91. H.R. 15333, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. (1906).
92. H.R. RaP. No. 3219, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906).
93. H.R. 15333, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. § 14 (1906). This states:
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tion 14 of the Five Civilized Tribes Act discussed above.94 The Committee on Indian Affairs, without further explanation, recommended

that the reversionary provisions be deleted and the current language of
the Osage Allotment Act be substituted.9 5 In reviewing the amend-

ments to H.R. 15333, C.F. Larrabee, Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, approved this revision stating "Section 13 is not identical with

section 14 of the original bill, relating to railway companies, but the
Office sees no objection to the section as it now stands." 96 Perhaps the
Interior Department's decision to acquiesce in the revised language re-

garding railroad rights of way is best understood from a "squeaky
wheel gets oil" perspective. The letters on file concerning the Osage

Allotment Act focused on: the extension of oil and gas leases and the
preservation of mineral rights;9 7 the situs where the original Osage patents should be filed;98 the preservation of lands and improvements used

by a white trader;99 tribal enrollment and a time frame for full United
States citizenship for the Osages. t°° Additionally, there were no rail-

roads traversing Osage County prior to the construction of the Midland
Valley line in 1905.101

Unlike the Five Civilized Tribes, who had

coped with railroad abandonments, bankruptcies and mergers,1

2

the

Osages had not yet dealt with these types of problems since relocation

to Oklahoma.
SEC. 14. That all lands taken by any railroad company for right of way or other railroad
purposes inthe Osage Indian Reservation... shall be used for right of way or other
railroad purposes only; and if said lands are usedfor any purpose other than railroad
purposes,saidlands so used shallrevert to the OsageIndiantribeor the individualmembers
of said tribe, accordingto the roll hereinprovided, or to their heirs,as hereinprovided

Id. (emphasis added).
94. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
95. H.R. REP. No. 3219, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1906).
96. Letter from C.F. Larrabee to the Secretary of the Interior (May 31, 1906), reprintedin S.
REP.No. 4210, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1906).
97. Cf Letter from Henry Rogers to the Hon. Arthur L. Bates (Feb. 27, 1906) (accompanying
a petition opposing oil and gas lease provisions in H.R. 15333 and expressing fear that the bill's
current provisions would mean that the area would be controlled by Standard Oil Company); with
Letter from C.F. Larrabee, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to the Secretary of Interior
(June 16, 1906) (expressing concern that the provisions in H.R. 15333 left "too much of a loophole for graft" quoting Letter from R.D. Hood to C.F. Larrabee (June 5, 1906)).
98. See Letter from H.P. White to Hon. James S. Sherman (Mar. 22, 1906) (Act needs to
specify that the allotment deeds will be recorded in Pawhuska [now Osage County, Oklahoma]).
99. See Letters from C.F. Larrabee, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to the Secretary
of Interior (Mar. 13, 1906 and June 28, 1906) (ten acres rather than forty should be reserved for
the Florer property).
100. See Letter from F.E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to the Secretary of Interior
(Mar. 10, 1906) (limit the reopening of tribal rolls for fraud only upon newly discovered evidence;
full United States citizenship should be granted at the end of the twenty-five year trust period).
101. See HISTORiCAL ATLAs, supranote 3, Map 53.

102. Cf.Miner, supra note 6.
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The defendants in Alterberry maintained that the Osage Allotment
Act is primarily concerned with reservation of the mineral rights underlying railroad easements rather than disposition of the right of way
upon abandonment. 0 3 This lack of a reversionary provision is a rather
glaring omission in controlling federal legislation, especially when
compared to the clear statement of congressional intent regarding ownership of reversionary interest for railroad rights of way in the Five
Civilized Tribes Act.' °4
On June 26, 1906, two days before the Osage Allotment Act was
passed, Congress passed the Oklahoma and Arizona Railroad Act'
which placed railroad rights of way on public lands in these two territo06
ries under the provisions of the General Railroad Right of Way Act.1
By placing public lands in Oklahoma under the General Railroad
Right of Way Act, Congress partially dissolved the legislative void inherently created by sections 13 through 23 of the Enid and Anadarko
Act. The legislative history of the Oklahoma and Arizona Railroad
Act 0 7 reveals a concern about protecting existing rights of way so that
the railroads would not be forced to pay twice for the same easement. 108 This 1906 Act meant that upon abandonment, the reversionary interest in the railroad right of way reverts to the abutting
landowners on non-Indian lands. 09 Still, Oklahoma Territory Indian
lands remained within a legislative void.
In 1908, while in the process of amending the Five Civilized
Tribes Act, Congress partially amended the Enid and Anadarko Act. t11
Although this 1908 Act was primarily concerned with revisions to the
restrictions on alienation of the Five Civilized Tribes allotments in the
former Indian Territory,' the Act provides that:
No restriction of alienation shall be construed to prevent the exercise
of the right of eminent domain in condemning rights of way for public purposes over allotted lands, and for such purposes sections thirteen through twenty-three inclusive, of... [the Enid and Anadarko
103. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 11-12, Atterberry. See also Act of
June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539.
104. Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.
105. Act of June 26, 1906, ch. 3548, 34 Stat. 481, (repealed as to lands in the National Forest
System by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2793 (1976)).
106. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-938 (1982)).
107. S. REP. No. 1417, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906); H.R. REP. No. 4777, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1906).
108. S. REP. No. 1417, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1-2 (1906).
109. See supra note 67 (discussion of Great Northern).
110. Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312.
111. Id.
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Act] are hereby continued in force in the State of Oklahoma.1

The Atterberrycourt stated that this 1908 Act "did not apply to the
Osage Tribe of Indians but the language of the Act is significant in that

only 'section thirteen through twenty-three inclusive' of the Enid and
' 3
Anadarko Act are 'continued in force in the State of Oklahoma'." "
The court was apparently concerned about applying an amendment occuring within revisions to the Five Civilized Tribes Allotment legislation to the Enid and Anadarko Act. Nonetheless, the 1908 Act is a

further example of the ad hoc nature of congressional enactments pertaining to Oklahoma Indians. There are very specific legislative mandates for the Five Civilized Tribes of the former Indian Territory but
inadequate provisions for the Indian tribes, including the Osages, of the
former Territory of Oklahoma.
Finally, congressional policy for its own lands [i.e., public lands]
was clearly estabished by the Act of March 8, 1922.1 14 This Act provides that title in an abandoned or forfeited railroad right of way reverts to the current owner of the subdivision from which the right of

way was created.115
Thus, a legislative review indicates a hodge-podge of ad hoc measures designed to meet specific situations often with little recognition of
the long-range consequences created by incremental change." 6 How112. Id. at § 1, 35 Stat. 312, 312.
113. United States v. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 11 (N.D.Okla. June
25, 1984) (Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
114. Act of Mar. 8, 1922, ch. 94, 42 Stat. 414 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 912 (1982)).
115. Id. This statue reads in part:
Whenever public lands of the United States have been or may be granted to any railroad
company for use as a right of way ... and use and occupancy of said lands for such
purposes has ceased or shall hereafter cease, whether by forfeiture or by abandonment
by said railroad company. . . then. . . all right, title, interest, and estate of the United
States in said lands shall ... be transferred to and vested in any person, firm, or corporation, assigns, or successors in title and interest to whom or to which title of the United
States may have been or may be granted, conveying or purporting to convey the whole of
the legal subdivision or subdivisions traversed or occupied by such railroad or railroad
structures of any kind as aforesaid, except lands within a municipality the title to which,
upon forfeiture or abandonment, as herein provided, shall vest in such municipality, and
this by virtue of the patent thereto and without the necessity of any other or further
conveyance or assurance of any kind of nature whatsoever ....
Id This language is very similar to the provisions in § 14 of the Five Civilized Tribes Act, ch.
1876, 34 Stat. 137, 142; see supra note 73. Cf.Noble v. Oklahoma City, 297 U.S. 481 (1936)
(because of specific restrictions in conveyance, right of way reverted to remote grantor rather than
to the municipality) with Wyoming v. Andrus, 602 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1979) (title to right of way
reverted to the current owner of estate from which it was created).
116. Cf.J. RARICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROBLEMS IN LANDS ALLOTTED TO AMERICAN INDIANS 423-70 (rev. 1st perm. ed. 1982) (a comprehensive analysis of all the legislation and
case law affecting Osage titles to real property).
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ever, four patterns of congressional intent emerge from the legislation
since 1875 involving railroads in Oklahoma. First, the rights of way
were easements and not fee simple grants. Second, the right of eminent
domain was reserved for the railroad. Third, existing rights of way
were to be preserved during the allotment process. Finally, upon abandonment of the right of way, the easement attaches to the adjoining
lands, except for Indian lands in the former Oklahoma Territory.
Moreover, it is clear that when the Midland Valley Railroad acquired
its interest in the right of way, it was limited to an easement which
could not be converted to a fee simple interest because of the language
of sections 13 through 23 of the Enid and Anadarko Act."I7 Oklahoma
statutes clearly provided that abandoned railroad rights of way revert
to the abutting landowners." 8 The Five Civilized Tribes Act made
very explicit provisions regarding railway line abandonments in Indian
Territory." 9 The Oklahoma and Arizona Railroad Act brought nonIndian lands in Oklahoma Territory back within the general rule regarding right of way abandonments.120 However, on Indian lands in
Oklahoma Territory, especially on the former Osage reservation, there
is a legislative gap. Because the unambiguous provisions regarding reversionary interests in railroad rights of way found in the Five Civilized Tribes Act are lacking in the Osage Allotment Act,' 2' an
examination of the original Osage patents is required to determine
what was actually allotted and whether the Osage Tribe specifically re122
tained a reversionary interest in the right of way.
IV.

THE ORIGINAL OSAGE PATENTS

In dealing with the status of rights of way, a major question is
whether an allotment of lands by the Indian tribe has finally and completely ended the interest of the tribe therein, or whether the tribe retains some equitable interest in the land conveyed. Prior to the passage
of the Osage Allotment Act," 2 the Midland Valley Railroad acquired
117. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, §§ 13-23, 32 Stat. 43, 47-50. See supra notes 33-47 and

accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.

120. See supranotes 105-09 and accompanying text.
121. See supranotes 80-104 and accompanying text.
122. See Adams v. Osage Tribe of Indians, 59 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1932), cert. denied,287 U.S.
652 (1932) (the deed contained an expressed reservation of mineral rights in favor of the Osage
Tribes, so the plain language of the deed controls the conveyance).
123. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, § 2, 34 Stat. 539, 540 (1906).
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an easement through the former Osage Reservation. 2 4 At the time of
allotment, the railroad had a vested interest in the easement. The congressional purpose for allotment was to equally divide all the land
among the Osage Tribe members.' 2 5 Similar to the Five Civilized
Tribes,"2 6 the Osage Indians held more than the ordinary tribal title to
their tribal lands as evidenced by the fact that during the allotment of
the lands the Tribal Chief and the Secretary of the Interior of the
United States executed the patents.' 27
The quality of the estate given to each allottee was to be fee simple
absolute with a reservation of mineral interest in the tribal community
for 25 years, as well as some restrictions on alienability and taxation.

Theoretically, these severed mineral interests were to rejoin the land
and give the allottee the absolute fee in the minerals as well as the
surface. 12 Upon selection and allotment of all the land, each allottee
received an allotment deed for homestead and an allotment deed for
surplus lands.
Allotment deeds are government patents which provide root of title from the sovereign.' 29 A government patent "form[s] the first link in
any complete chain of title-to any tract of land, located anywhere in
the United States."' 30 Moreover, a government patent is strictly
construed:
[A] patent is in the nature of a quitclaim releasing whatever title the
United States might otherwise assert and is not subject to collateral
attack. A title thus confirmed is held to be a good title and conclusive as to the existence, validity, and confirmation of the Grant as
againstthe United States and all persons claiming under it by subse124. See United States v. Midland Valley R.R., No. 353 Civil, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Okla 1942)
(the court found that construction started on or about May 5, 1905). See also Petitioner's Complaint at 1,Alterberry.
125. See H.R. REP. No. 3219, 59th Cong., IstSess. (1906), which stated that the purpose behind H. R. 15333 (the Osage Allotment Act) was "for equally dividing the lands among the members [of the Osage Tribe] who are entitled to enrollment, giving each hisfairsharein acresas nearly
aspossible." Id.at I (emphasis added).

126. Cf Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, § 23, 31 Stat. 861, 867-68 (the principal chief of the new
Creek Tribe will issue patents using blank forms supplied by the Secretary of the Interior) with
Five Civilized Tribes Act, Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 6, 34 Stat. 137, 139 (1906) (a principal
chief who fails to sign "any instrument" may be removed for cause).
127. Osage Allotment Act, ch. 3572, § 8, 34 Stat. 539, 545 (1906). See infra note 133.
128. The minerals have remained severed from the surface and continued to be held by the
Osage Tribe in its entirety. See Pub. L. No. 95-496, §§ 4-5, 92 Stat. 1660, 1661 (1978).
129. See 2 R. PATrON & C. PATrON, PATrON ON LAND TITLES § 281, at 2-6 (1957). Seealso
5B G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2725 (nature of government patents).
130. 2 R. PATTON & C. PATTON, supra note 129, § 281, at 6 (emphasis in original).
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13

quent grant. 1
An examination of the Osage allotment deeds that contain a reservation for the railroad right of way reveals that the deeds were jointly
issued by the Secretary of the Interior and the Principal Chief of the
Osage Tribe as required by section 8 of the Osage Allotment Act. 132
These deeds 133 contain three specific reservations:
1. Each was issued subject to the existing railroad easement ("less
'X' acres for right of way of Midland Valley Railroad") although
no adjustment was made in the 160 acre allotments to accommodate the allottee for the acreage lost due to the easement. 134
131. Id at § 285, at 10-11 (emphasis added). THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY is in accord with
PATRON ON TITLES regarding government patents.

A federal patent to lands is the equivalent of a quitclaim deed ....

It is the last official

act of the government in its procedure to divest itself of public lands, and is impeachable
only for fraud or mistake. The federal patent is said to be the highest and best deed

known to the law.
5B G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 383.

132. Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539, 545.
133. For illustrative purpose, see allotment deed dated Oct. 9, 1908 and approved on Feb. 8,
1909, from the United States and the Osage Tribe to Hum-pah-to-kah or Tresa Whitehorn, an
Osage Indian allottee (also found in the Records of the County Clerk of Osage County at Book 2,
Page 176) [hereinafter cited as Representative Allotment Deed]. In pertinent part, the deed
provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, the undersigned, Principal Chief of the Osage Tribe of
Indians, by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the said Act of Congress
have granted and conveyed, and by these presents do grant and convey, unto the said
Hum-pah-to-kah or Tresa Whitehorn all right, title, and interest of thefollowing United
States andthe Osage Tribe ofIndians in and to the following described lands situated on
the Osage Reservation in Oklahoma to-wit:
.. . [description of land] less 2.69 acresforright of way of the Midland Valley railroad,[description of land] less 4.64acresforright of way ofthe Midland Valley railroadin
[Section, Township and Range]. . . East of the Meridian, containing 152.67 acres, more
or less, according to the United States survey thereof, to have and to hold the same unto
the said [allottee's name, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assignsforever; subject,
however, to all the conditions, limitations, andprovisions of saidAct of Congress,one of
which is said that the homestead selection shall be inalienable and non-taxable until
otherwise provided by Act of Congress, and all mineral in said land is reserved to the
Osage Tribe of Indians for the period of twenty-five years from and after the eighth day
of April, 1906 ....
Id (emphasis added).
134. Id See also Affidavit [by Bruce Gambill] in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Atterberry (when "railroad easements are reflected in.

.

. [the Osage] acreage allotments.

. .

no

compensating acreage was deeded to said allottees."). Cf.H.R. REP. No. 217, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1921). In describing the purpose of H.R. 244 (Act of Mar. 8, 1922), the report stated:
[I]n making conveyances of subdivisions [of public lands] traversed by such [railroad]
rights of way the United States issues patents for the full area of the tracts or legal subdivisions, making no diminution by reason of the prior grant of the right of way.
It seemed to the committee that such abandoned or/orfeitedstrips are of little or no
value to the Government and that in case of lands in the rural communities they ought in
justice to become the property of the person to whom the whole of the legal subdivision
has been granted or his successor in interest. Grantingsuch reliefin reality gives him only
the land covered by the originalpatent.
Id.at 2 (emphasis added). See also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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2. Each contained expressed limitations concerning the inalienability and non-taxability of the land "until otherwise provided by
Act of Congress,"' 35 and,
3. All mineral fights were "reserved to the Osage Tribe". 36
By virtue of the clear language in the allotment deeds, the Osage
allottees acquired fee simple title to the individually allotted lands, except for the minerals. The United States and the Osage Tribe, as a
whole, were completely divested of any title to the surface.' 37 There
was no express reservation of the fee title to the railroad right of way by
the Osage Tribe or the United States government on behalf of the
Tribe. Thus, the right of way should revert to the abutting landowners,
unless the described parcel of land, which conveyed the land "less 'X'
acres for right of way for the Midland Valley Railroad Company" in
the allotment deeds, served as an impliedreservation rather than a limitation on the grantor's liability to the estate transferred to the allottee.13 8 Therefore, federal and state common law must be used to
determine the nature of the grant conveyed.
V.

COMMON LAW ANALYSIS

The common law rule on easements is that an abandoned or vacated fight of way reverts to the abutting landowners and not to the
original grantor: "Lands abandoned as [railroad] right of way constitute private land of the abutting owners freed from right of way easement whenever the right of way was an easement only."' 39 This is
because the easement is a "burden or encumbrance on the servient estate. So, when the easement ends, the freehold ceases to be burdened
and remains as before except that the encumbrance is no longer on its
back."140 Unless there is an expressed reversionary interest in the deed
in favor of the original grantor, the common law assumes that a conveyance of the servient estate is also a conveyance of the reversionary
135. See Representative Allotment Deed, supranote 133.
136. Id.
137. See Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 179 Okla. 561, 66 P.2d 1069 (1937) where the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the meaning of "less the right of way" and "except [the] right
of way" was unambiguous. By using this language, the grantor conveyed his entire interest in the
servient estate and at the same time expressly recognized and acknowledged the easement. Thus,
the reversionary interest in the right of way was conveyed to the grantee.
138. But cf. Palmer v. Campbell, 333 P.2d 957 (Okla. 1959) (a deed of conveyance which
contains no expressed reservations to show the grantor's intent to reserve any interest in the property conveys to the grantee all of the interest vested in the grantor at the time of the execution of
the deed).
139. 1 R. PATTON & C. PATTON, supra note 129, § 420, at 268.
140. 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 450, at 756.
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interest in the easement. 141 This is because the advantages of owning
42

long narrow strips of land are considered de minimus1
These common law rules were adopted by the Tenth Circuit in
ShellPetroleum Corp. v. Hollow in 1934.14 3 The court held that a deed

conveying a tract "excepting one acre", which had been conveyed to a
school district for so long as the property was used for school purposes,
operated to convey the grantor's reversionary interest in the one acre.
Therefore, the grantee had fee title to that one acre upon its abandon-

ment for school purposes. 44 In arriving at that conclusion, the court
relied heavily on the common law presumption, created as a matter of
public policy, that a conveyance of land carries with it the grantor's
interest in strips, gores and small parcels which have been carved out of

it by prior conveyance of an interest less than a fee simple absolute.14S
The Shell Petroleum rule of reversion was quickly applied to railroad rights of way in general and to Indian Territory lands in particular in United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 14 6 In Magnolia
Petroleumthe issue was whether the reversionary right to minerals underlying a railroad right of way easement belonged to the original allottee or to the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes, who originally granted
141. See 1 R. PATRON & C. PATON, supra note 129, § 161, at 430-33. Accord 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 381, at 513.
142. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.112 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
The construction in the case of public rights of way is... based upon the greater
public convenience of having the title held locally and the lack of practical benefit to the
grantor to justify a construction of intent to retain title to the strip of land. . . [Tihe
grantee takes title. . .
Id. at 428-29.
143. 70 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1934) (owners of mineral rights to school lands).
144. Id.
145. Id at 814. The court explained:
The servient estate in a small tract, usually in the form of a strip set apart for highway or
railway right of way purposes, passes with a conveyance of the fee to the abutting tract of
which the strip formerly was a part. The servient estate passes with such a conveyance,
even though no express provision to that effect is contained in the instrument. The rule
is that such estate passes unless it is excluded by clear, unequivocal, and unmistakable
language. The considerations of sound public policy evoking the application of that
doctrine and constituting its undergirder, as well as the mischief sought to be obviated by
it, was declared by the late Chief Justice Taft... in Paine.... "The evils resulting
from the retention in remote dedicators of the fee in gores and strips, which for many
years are valueless because of the public easement in them, and which then become
valuable by reason of an abandonment of the public use, have led courts to strained
constructions to include the fee of such gores and strips in deeds of the abutting lots.
And modem decisions are even more radical in this regard than the older cases."
Id. (quoting Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 F. 626, 632 (6th Cir, 1895) (ownership of two strips of land on the other side of a subsequently vacated public highway held to
belong to neither the remote grantor nor the grantee)).
146. 110 F.2d 212, 217-18 (10th Cir. 1939).
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the allotments but reserved the easement. 147 Even though the allottee
had received additional acreage to compensate for the easement, the
court held that there was a strong presumption in favor of the rever-

sionary interest vesting in the owner of the subdivision from which the
right of way easement had been carved since the allotment deed did not

spectally reserve this reversionary interest for the grantor Indian
tribe.' 48 Thus, Magnolia Petroleum refused to recongnize an implied

reservation of a reversionary interest in a railroad right of way.
The Magnolia Petroleum rule on reversionary interests in railroad
rights of way has been consistently affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. 149 It
was also adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1975.150 The
147. Id at 214-15 (the Choctaw and Chickasaw Ry. was the original easement holder).
148. Id at 217.
149. Cf. United States v. Drumb, 152 F.2d 821, 822 (10th Cir. 1946) (The railroad had obtained a right of way in easement through former Choctaw and Chickasaw lands. This land was
exempted from allotment and set aside for railway purposes within the limits of a municipality.
The municipality exchanged parcels with the railway and then issued quitclaim deeds on subdivided lots created out of the original parcel and sold these to individuals. The title to the right of
way reverted to the abutting landowners.); Seminole Nation v. White, 224 F.2d 173, 173-74 (10th
Cir. 1955) (The allotment deed was issued "less [X] acres occupied as [railroad] right-of-way" by
the Choctaw, Oklahoma and Gulf Railroad. Even though the Indian allottee received additional
land to compensate for the railroad easement, title to the underlying fee vested in the allottee of
her heirs or assigns rather than the Indian tribe as remove grantor.); Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v.
Town of Maysville, 249 F.2d 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1957) (Under the Five Civilized Tribes Act, "title
to lands within a municipality, should upon abandonment vest in such municipality."); St. LouisS.F. Ry. v. Town of Francis, 249 F.2d 546, 547-48 (10th Cir. 1957) (The railroad company could
only acquire rights of way in easement from the Indians under the Act of Mar. 30, 1896 and the
Enid and Anadarko Act. The railroad company failed to convert this easement into a fee simple
pursuant to § 14 of Five Civilized Tribes Act. Since the land was within municipal boundaries,
title to the underlying fee vested in the municipality rather than the abutting landowners as provided by the exception to the general rule found in the Five Civilized Tribes Act.); City of Wilburton v. Swafford, 253 F.2d 479, 481-83 (10th Cir. 1958) (A government patent was issued to Indian
allottee "including [X] acres subject to right of way for M.K.&T. Railway". Reversionary interest
vested in the allottee, his heirs or assigns rather than in the municipality which annexed the subdivision from which the easement was carved.); Wallace v. Swafford, 273 F.2d 602, 604-05 (10th Cir.
1959) (Grantor obtained land from Indian tribe subject to railroad right of way easement. Subsequently, grantor conveyed portions of the property in three separate deeds. Careful reading of the
deeds revealed that grantor intended to retain the reversionary interest in the railroad right of way
because the lands previously conveyed were west of the highway while the railroad right of way
was north of the highway.); Fitzgerald v. City of Ardmore, 281 F.2d 717, 718 (10th Cir. 1960)
(When the railroad company failed to acquire a fee simple interest in the right of way pursuant to
§ 14 of the Five Civilized Tribes Act, the reversionary interest in the right of way vested in the
Indian allottee who was owner of the legal subdivision from which the right of way was carved.
Since these lands were not located within the municipality in 1908 when the reversionary interest
was vested, the allottee's successors in interest, rather than the municipality, had superior title to
the right of way).
150. See Sand Springs Home v. State ex rel.Dep't. of Highways, 536 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Okla.
1975) (Railroad's interest in railroad right of way was limited to an easement when the right of
way was condemned by the State for highway purposes. Upon abandonment, the interest in the
easement reverted to the owners of the underlying fee, i.e., the successors in interest to the Indian
allottees, from which the right of way had been carved.).
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only exception to this rule occured under the Five Civilized Tribes Act
when the right of way was located within a municipality.5 By this exception the municipality could receive the right of way.' '
Case law that is strictly concerned with an interpretation of the

Enid and Anadarko Act, unamended by the Five Civilized Tribes Act,
was-not pertinent to the issues raised in Atterberr. These cases focused

on adverse possession, 152 the application of state law to a railroad deriving its right of way from a federal enactment,15 3 and whether a purported fee simple conveyance by a Pawnee Indian allottee was void ab
inihio. 54 The one case which appears to be on point is also of questionable validity. In UnitedStates v. Texas andPacificRailway,155 the issue

before the court was ownership of an abandoned railroad right of way
within the City of Pawhuska, Osage County, Oklahoma.15

6

In inter-

preting sections 13 through 23 of the Enid and Anadarko Act, the court
held that the railroad's interest in the right of way was an easement
151. See Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. v. City of Ada, 182 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir. 1950)
(The Five Civilized Tribes Act provided that abandoned railroad right of way easements reverted

to the abutting landowners unless the land was located inside a municipality. Even though the
municipality had assessed property taxes against the railroad company for the land in question, it
was not estopped from asserting that the land reverted to the city upon abandonment by the
railroad.); Town of Maysville v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 272 F.2d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1959)

(Even though a municipality had never been validly incorporated, it was in de facto existence at
the time of statehood. The railroad company had failed to convert its right of way easement into a
fee simple interest pursuant to Five Civilized Tribes Act, § 14. Since the disputed right of way
was within the boundaries of a preexisting municipality, the reversionary interest vested in the
municipality rather than the abutting landowners pursuant to the municipality exception in § 14.);
Midwestern Developments v. City of Tulsa, 259 F.Supp. 554 (N.D. Okla. 1966) (Railroad had not
abandoned right of way since both highway and railroad actively shared the easement, thus right
of way still had not vested in abutting property owner.); Fitzgerald, discussed supra note 149;
contra Noble v. Oklahoma City, 297 U.S. 481 (1936) (Remote grantors who expressly retained
reversionary interest in easement had superior title to municipality's statutory claim; right of way
went to abutting landowner as assignee of remote grantor.).
152. See St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. McBride, 104 Okla. 216, 219, 234 P. 284, 286 (1924). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that neither laches nor the statute of limitations can be used to
establish adverse possession of an unused portion of the railroad right of way against the Indian
tribe as owner of the reversionary interest.
153. See City of Tulsa v. Midland Valley R.R., 168 F.2d 252, 253-54 (10th Cir. 1948). In
determining whether the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine and prescribe location of highway crossings over railroads in Oklahoma, the court held that
enumeration of specific powers in a statute operates to exclude those not enumerated. Statutes are
strictly construed and not repealed by implication. Railroad rights of way obtained pursuant to
the Enid and Anadarko Act are subject to regulation by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.
154. See Haymond v. Scheer, 543 P.2d 541 (Okla. 1975). The Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that the Enid and Anadarko Act limited railroad rights of way to easements. A conveyance made
by Pawnee allottee to railroad company purporting to grant a fee simple interest in the right of
way was void ab initio. Title to the underlying fee vested in the heirs of Pawnee allotee.
155. United States v. Texas and Pac. Ry., No. 70-C-329, slip op. (N.D. Okla. Feb. 22, 1972).
156. Id. at 1.
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rather than a fee simple interest.' 5 7 This holding is consistent with
other interpretations of the Act.' 58 The court went on to find that the
underlying fee to the right of way was presumed to vest in the Osage
Tribe as opposed to the City of Pawhuska or the abutting

landowners. 159
This latter holding is questionable for three reasons. First, the
City of Pawhuska was not an abutting landowner. The city was concerned about a utility line easement. None of the abutting landowners
actively participated in the action but defaulted and failed to appear
before the court.' 61 It would appear that the City of Pawhuska was
without standing and the court had no jurisdictional authority to determine the property rights of the abutting landowners.16 1 Second, the
court did not consider all of the applicable statutory authority. The
only legislative issue before the court was an interpretation of the Enid
and Anadarko Act in light of the Osage Allotment Act.' 62 The court's
ruling on this matter failed to consider the full mosaic of the legislative
history, as discussed in this Comment, because the legislative history
was never placed before the court. Finally, the court's interpretation of
section 11 of the Osage Allotment Act 163 was a very literal interpretation which did not consider the actual language of the original Osage
allotment patents as quitclaim deeds"6 nor the failure by the Osage
Tribe to compensate the allottees for the land lost to the railroad right
of way in their 160 acre allotment.' 6 5 Texas andPacjfc is the key case
157. Id at 6.

158. Cf supra notes 146-50.
159. Texas and Pac. Ry., No. 70-C-329, slip op. at 5-7 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 22, 1972).
160. Id at 1-2.

161. Cf. Summers v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., No. 5452-Civil, slip op. (E.D. Okla. Nov. 6, 1964).
Although the conveyance of the right of way by the Creek allottee to the railroad company was
purportedly in fee simple, at the time of the conveyance the Enid and Anadarko Act limited
acquisition of rights of way to an easement in the land. The railroad company never converted its
easement into a fee simple interest pursuant to § 14 of the Five Civilized Tribes Act; therefore, the
reversionary interest vested in the allottee. Although plaintiff was abutting landowner and
claimed root of title from the allottee, careful reading of the conveyances revealed that plaintiff
was not the owner of the subdivision from which the right of way had been carved. The reversionary interest remained vested in the Creek allottee and his heirs, beneficiaries, and assigns. See also
Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 815 U.S. 262 (1942) (court recognized claims of United
States for abandoned right of way only for those parcels in which the government was the abutting
landowner). See supra note 67.
162. Texas and Pac.RJy., No. 70-C-329, slip op. at 5-6 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 22, 1972).
163. Id See also Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3548, § 11, 34 Stat. 539, 545.
164. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
165. See Defendants' Oral Arguments on the Motions for Summary Judgment (Mar. 22,
1984), Allerberry.
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upon which the United States based its argument in A//erberry

66

Since all the subissues found in Atterberry regarding other applicable
legislation and the nature of the allotment patents were never presented

to the Texas andPacific court, that case seems to have limited validity
in a determination of the Atterberry issue. 167 The Texas and Pacific

case is at best an anomaly; every other case pertaining to railroad right
of way easements in Oklahoma has held that the underlying fee to the
easement vested in the abutting landowner unless there were unique

circumstances in the deed
ity.

169

68

or the land was located in a municipal-

Thus, an examination of case law reveals a judicial intent to

include Indian lands within the common law unless there is an overriding and express statutory provision to the contrary. 7 0

The pattern which emerges regarding railroad rights of way on
Indian land is an attempt to follow the common law which disfavors an
implied reservation of an interest in an easement once title is transferred to the property. Although the Osage Indian tribe is different
from other tribes in certain respects, such as the allotment of all tribal

lands, head rights and mineral leasing, these differences are not sufficient to justify placing them outside the common law rule regarding
abandoned railroad rights of way.
VI.

THE A7TERBERRY DEcIsION

As mentioned above, the Atterberry court ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that title to the reversionary interest in the aban-

doned right of way vests in the abutting landowners rather than the
Osage Tribe.17 1 The court ruled 172 that the reversionary clause found
166. See Plaintiffs Oral Arguments on the Motions for Summary Judgment (Mar. 22, 1984),
Afterberry.

167. See Defendants' Oral Arguments on the Motions for Summary Judgment (Mar. 22,
1984), Atterberry. See also Answer Brief of Defendants [Kane, Kane, Wilson & Mattingly] at 910, Alerberry; Answer Brief of Defendants [Rogers and Bell] at 16-18, Afterberry.
168. Cf. Aubert v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 207 Okla. 537, 251 P.2d 190, 194 (1952) (Enabling legislation limited the railroad to acquisition of easement rights of way which would revert to the
Indians from which the right of way was granted upon abandonment for railroad purposes. At
the time of conveyances to the railroad, lands were held in fee by the grantor. Ownership of the
underlying fee to the right of way vested in the current owner of the estate from which the easement was carved); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Blackmon, 229 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1956) (deed
granted to railroad "for right of way purposes" did not grant fee title); supra note 151 (discussion
of Noble v. Oklahoma City).
169. See supranote 151 and accompanying text.
170. See "Table: Summary of Cases Relating to Osage Allotment Deeds or Oklahoma Railroad Easements" in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 18-30, Afterberry. See also
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 31 (N.D. Okla. June
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in section 2 of the Enid and Anadarko Act' 7 3 does not apply to rights of
way obtained pursuant to section 13 through 23 of this Act. 74 The
court examined the 1908 Act'7 5 which partially amended the Enid and
Anadarko Act so that only "sections thirteen through twenty-three...
are hereby continued in force in the State of Oklahoma."' 176 The court

utilized the legislative history of the Enid and Anadarko Act and confirmed that the Act is two separate pieces of legislation with two differ77 The Atterberry court cited178
ent purposes enacted together.'

Oklahoma, K.& M I Ry v. Bowling

79

which interpreted the 1908 Act

and which provided that after statehood, the Enid and Anadarko Act

applied only to the lands of restricted Indians.180 The Atterberry court
ruled that:
Congress simply failed to specifically provide for reversion under the
'General right of way' provisions (Sections 13 through 23) of the
Enid and Anadarko Act, and have [sic] not enacted any legislation
covering reversion with respect to rights of way acquired under the
Enid and Anadarko Act in the Osage Reservation since the passage
of the act in 1902.181

In reaching this decision, however, the Atterberry court did not apply
Oklahoma law'8 2 (as suggested in Bowling" 3 ) to resolve this legislative

full panorama of federal
void nor did the decision clearly focus on the
84
enactments as discussed in this Comment.1
25, 1984) (Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
172. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 20.
173. Act of Feb. 28, 1902, ch. 134, § 2, 32 Stat. 43, 43-44.
174. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
175. Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, § 1, 35 Stat. 312, 312.
176. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 11-12.
177. Id at 15.
178. Id at 11.
179. 249 F. 592 (8th Cir. 1918).
180. Id.at 594.
181. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 15.
182. Id See also supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
183. 249 F. at 594. The court stated:
The act of 1902 prescribed a procedure for the exercise of the right of eminent domain
and by its terms applied to all lands in the Indian Territory, regardless of Indian title. . . .But the comprehensive scope of the legislation did not survive the admission of
the state. By the act of 1908 Congress merely sought to preserve it so far as it affected
subject to restrictions
Indian lands including those that had been allotted but were still
against alienation. That was the extent of its interest during statehood. The power of
Congress to legislate ends when the transitory character of the subject-matter ceases to
. The obvious, apparentreasonforthe continuance ofthe legisbe of federal concern ...
lation in question during statehoodisin the peculiarcharacterofthe tenure ofa particular
class of lands, and when that ceases the laws of the state attach and are exclusive.

Id.(emphasis added).
184. See supranotes 65-121 and accompanying text. The Atterberry court incorrectly held that
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The Atterberry decision relied upon a recent United States Claim
Court case, Capurro v. United States,t8 5 which adopted the common
law rule found in Magnolia Petroleum,'8 6 and its progeny.' 87 Capurro
involved a disputed railroad right of way on Indian lands in Nevada. 88
The Capurro court followed "the common law"' 8 9 and held that the
abandoned right of way reverted to the adjoining landowner rather
than to the Indian tribe as remote grantor. 190 Apparently, Capurrois
the first application of this Magnolia Petroleum rule to Indian lands
"acts covering rights of way through thepublic landsof the United States," such as the Act of 1906
and the Act of 1922, cannot be used to resolve right of way problems on Indian lands. Atterberry,
Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 15. (emphasis in original).
185. 2 Cl. Ct. 722 (1983).
186. 110 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1939). See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 149-51. The Capurrocourt specifically relied on the Fitzgerald v. City of
Ardmore, and United States v. Drumb, [supra note 149] and Sand Springs Home v. State ex rel.
Departmentof Highways, [supranote 150] cases.
188. 2 Cl. Ct. at 723. In Capurro, a party named Sutcliffe occupied public land and established a cattle ranch upon it "near the middle of the nineteenth century." Id. Subsequently, in
1874, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Reservation was created although Sutcliffe remained in
possession of his land and disputed title with the government. In 1910 the railroad obtained a
right of way through the reservation and in 1911 the railroad obtained a quitclaim deed from
Sutcliffe. Sutcliffe (or his heirs or assigns), however, did not obtain a government patent to the
land until 1924; approximately seventy-five years after he first occupied it. Similar to the problem
with the Osage patents, the railroad right of way "was expressly excluded from the patent." Id. at
724. In 1972, the railroad conveyed its interest in the right of way to the Paiute Indians with a
quitclaim deed. In 1978, the tribe's housing authority's construction of a dwelling which partially
encroached on the strip of land led to this suit. Id.
189. Id at 725.
190. Id The Claims Court ruled that the plaintiff rancher was entitled to the right of way,
even though, "Sutcliffe did not obtain any right to the land by virtue of the 1924 patent since the
patent specifically excluded the strip. Moreover, even if Sutcliffe had acquired an interest in the
land through his occupancy, he quitclaimed it to the railroad in 1911." Id at 724. The court did
not discuss the doctrine of after-acquired title in reaching this decision. The court also found the
right of way was an easement obtained under the Indian Railroad Right of Way Act [see supra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text]. The Claims Court refused to apply the 1922 Act [see supra
notes 114-15 and accompanying text], or the Great Northern ruling [see discussion supra note 67].
The Claims Court stated:
[s]ection 912 by its terms applies only to rights-of-way [sic] through public land...
[and] is codified in Title 43 which governs the administration of public land. The rightof-way here in issue passed over Indian land... [and] is codified in Title 25 (Indians).
Indian land may, under certain circumstances, be treated as public land. . . . Nevertheless, it is a special category of property as to which Congress has passed a separate
series of laws. . ..
It is signfcant that Congress enactedsection 912 in Title 43... butlassedno similar
provisionsin Title 25governingthe extinguishment ofrailroadrights-of-way on Indian land
Under these circumstances,it would be wholly inappropriateto apply section 912 here.
Id. at 725 (citations omitted and emphasis added). The Claims Court never states why it finds this
Title 25 versus Title 43 dichotomy significant. This author, however, does not see the significance.
The whole history of railroad right of way acts in general, and Indian enactments in particular, is
an ad hoc response to the immediate problem with little congressional consideration given to how
the given incremental change cdrrently under consideration affects the whole mosaic of legislation. See supranotes 48-122 and accompanying text.
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outside of Oklahoma. 9 ' The Capurrocourt-said, "[i]t is significant that
this rule was developed by courts in the western United States where
this land is located. Courts familiar with local conditions are best
92
suited to enunciate and interpret the law pertaining to real estate."'1
In adopting Capurroand MagnoliaPetroleum to resolve the Osage
County right of way problem, the Atterberr court 19 3 correctly applied
common law principles "[s]ince statutory guidance . . . [was] lacking."' 94 But the Atterberry court did not extend its application of the
common law to overrule the Texas andPacflc case.' 95 The court did
not show the depth of antipathy found in the common law against retention by remote grantors of reversionary interests in "small strips and
gores" of land.' 9 6 The court did not consider that in issuing the patents
to the original allottees both the United States government and the
Osage Tribe divested themselves of their interest in all of the Osage
Reservation except for the specifically retained minerals and the limits
on alienability and taxation,' 97 and that the proper plaintiffs were the
allottees who received 160 acres of land subject to the railroad right of
way. These allottees should be made whole vis-A-vis the other Osage
allottees who received their 160 acre allotments unencumbered by a
right of way. It is imperative for the courts to confirm the common law
as defined in Great Northern Ry. v. United States'98 and Magnolia Petroleum,'99 which holds that the right of way runs with the land and
upon abandonment reverts to the original, allottee or his successors in
title, unless such right of way was specficaly and unequivocably retained
by the remote grantorrather thanjust acknowledged
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Osage Allotment Act as it pertains to railroads was primarily
concerned with reservation of the mineral rights underlying such easements rather than disposition of the right of way once abandoned. The
lack of an expressed reservation in the allotment deeds, and the lack of
191. See 2 C1. Ct. at 725-26.
192. Id.at 726.
193. Alterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 21-26.
194. 2 Cl. Ct. at 725.
195. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 5-6. (discussing United States v.
Texas and Pac. Ry., No. 70-C-328 slip op. (N.D. Okla. Feb. 22, 1982)). Seesupranotes 155-65 and

accompanying text.
196. Atterberry, Nos. 82-C-896-B through 82-C-949-B at 26-28.
197. See Representative Allotment Deed, supra note 133.
198. 315 U.S. 262 (1942); See discussion supra note 67.

199. 110 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1939). See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
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compensation to the original allottees for the land used for the right of
way, coupled with the silence of the Enid and Anadarko Act regarding
ownership of the reversionary interest, clearly indicate the common law
intent that the right of way should revert to the abutting landowners.
Land reverts to the Indian tribe, under statutory law, only when a
railroad failed to acquire an easement. In light of the Enid and
Anadarko Act's legislative history, the express wordings in the original
Osage allotment patents, and an analysis of federal and state common
law, both federal and state law are in accord regarding the ownership
of the abandoned railroad right of way in question in Afterberry. The
Atterberry court confirmed that when an easement is abandoned, the
estate out of which the right of way was carved receives the land; therefore, the reversionary interest vests in the abutting landowner, rather
than the Osage Tribe, as remote grantor. Unfortunately, the Atterberry
court did not recognize that Indian allotment deeds in Oklahoma are
quitclaim deeds from both the government and the Indian tribe. Moreover, this court did not specifically overrule the Texas andPacfic case.
The Atterberry court failed to completely close the door to costly and
time-consuming litigation regarding railroad abandonments in former
Oklahoma Territory.
Sharon J. Bell
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
PERTAINING TO RAILROAD RIGHTS OF
WAY IN OKLAHOMA

Year Act

Area Affected

Applicable Provision

1875

GENERAL RAILROAD RIGHT
OF WAY ACT OF MAL 3, 1875,
ch. 152, 18 Stalt. 482 (current version

All public lands in
U.S.A. except District
of Columbia and

Limits railroads on public lands to the acquisition
of rights of way in easement rather than in fee
simple. Original act did not contain a reversionary

at 43 U.S.C. § 934-938).

military and Indian

clause for abandoned rights of way.

reservations.
1899

INDIAN GENERAL RAILROAD
RIGHT OF WAY ACT OF MAR.
2, 1889, ch. 374, 30 Silt. 991 (current
version at 25 U.S.C. § 312-318).

All Indian lands
except Oklahoma.

25 U.S.C. § 312 limits railroads to acquisition of
right of way easements on unallotted Indian lands.
The Act lacks a reversionary clause for abandoned
rights of way.

1902

ENID AND ANADARKO ACT OF
FEB. 28, 1902, ch. 134, 34 SIaL 43.

Oklahoma and
Indian Territories

Provides for acquisition of easement rights of way.
Sections 13-23 do not contain a reversionary clause.

1906

FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES ACT
OF APRIL 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34
StaL 137.

Indian Territory only.

Section 14 amended the provisions of the Enid and
Anadarko Act by clarifying that the underlying
interest in the right of way vested in the estate
from which it was carved but:
I. the railroad had until 1908 to purchase a fee
interest in preexisting rights of way, and
2. if the land was located within a municipality
the reversionary interest would vest in the

municipality.
1906

OKLAHOMA AND ARIZONA
RAILROAD ACT OF JUNE 26,
1906, ch. 3548, 34 Stat. 481.

Oklahoma Territory

Provided that the General Railroad Right of Way
Act applies to non-Indian lands in Oklahoma
Territory.

1906

OSAGE ALLOTMENT ACT OF
JUNE 28, 1906, ch. 3572, § 11, 34
Stat. 539, 543-45.

Osage County.

Section II provides for the preservation of the
railroad rights of way as part of the allotment
process with a specific reservation (in favor of the
Osage Tribe) of mineral rights underlying the rights
of way.

1908

ACT OF MAY 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35
Stalt. 312.

Amended the Five
Civilized Tribes Act
and the Enid and
Anadarko Act.

Sections 13-23 of the Enid and Anadarko Act
apply only to Indian lands in State of Oklahoma.

1922

ACT OF MAR. 8, 1922, ch. 94, 42
StaL 414 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 912).

All federal public
lands,

Abandonment or forfeiture of a railroad right of
way vests the underlying fee in the current owner
of the subdivision from which the right of way was
created.
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